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Abstract
The deregulation of telecommunications has taken a major step with the WTO agreements in February of
this year. Namely, each of the major Far Eastern countries has agreed to open their market in some form of
planned entry. These markets will allow for the introduction of competition of local and international
services now currently restricted to the local PTT as well as allowing the entry of new services in what are
generally closed markets. This paper analyzes the implications of changes in several key Far eastern
countries and discusses how this will impact the U.S. economy and the overall policy implications that this
will focus on.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses the entry into a set of dominant Far Eastern markets. It discusses the current status, the
proposed changes in those markets and what is anticipated in terms of new entrants. In addition the paper
reviews the overall economy of each of these countries and presents an overview of the economic impact that
changes in regulation will have on each specific market. The paper also presents several case studies relating to
each of these markets to demonstrate the changes that are occurring and by focusing on specific example
attempt to project changes in these markets based upon actual results that have already occurred. The examples
focused upon are competition in local telephony, competition in wireless/cellular, competition in the LMDS
areas, and competition in international telecommunications.
The paper analyzes each of the opportunity segments across each of the target countries. The target countries
include the following: China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan,
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam. It discusses the potential economic impact upon the United
States as well as between and amongst the target countries that the proposed changes in deregulation may have.
The differing policy positions are reviewed and the relevance to the proposed current FCC positions are
analyzed in detail.
In the paper we specifically address the following questions:
• Does the “Trade in Services” resulting from the settlement rates have a significant positive influence on
the growth of telecommunications services?
 
• Does the growth in telecommunications services relate to the GDP or similar measures of the country’s
economic development status?
 
• Does the growth rate of a country’s economy correlates with the openness of that country’s market for
Trade in Services as relates to telecommunications?
 
• What should the U.S. position be regarding its ability to influence access to markets by its unilateral
power on settlements?
 
                                                          
1
 Presented at the Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, Alexandria, VA, September 28-30, 1997.
2
 Mr. McGarty is Chairman of Telmarc, Florham Park, NJ, and is also Chairman of Zephyr Telecommunications an International Record
carrier, and Chairman of COMAV, a Competitive Local Exchange Carrier, Framingham, MA. He is also a member of the Advisory
Council of the MIT Internet Telephony Group.
3
 Mr. Davidson is Chairman of Delta Three which is located in Jerusalem, Israel.
Page 2
• Does there exist a set of economic efficiencies in the use of telecommunications via enhanced services,
value added services, or Internet services that will allow such providers to have economic advantages to
side step the settlement process?
 
• What will be the effect of Internet and Internet like voice, video and data services wherein the “path” of
the message has no definition? Does any country have the tight to regulate a “mixed” message format?
2. TRADE IN SERVICES: SETTLEMENTS
The GATS, General Agreement for Trade in Services, which is a part of the current WTO structure, has
developed a set of rules and regulations an a schedule of timetable to open up the member markets to trade in
telecommunications services. There are three dimensions for such trade in services. The first two are basically
for the intra country markets and represent the local and long distance telephony market. The third is the
international telecommunications market. In all three cases we can further break this up into voice, data, video,
valued added services, and other types and classes of services. The breakout is shown as follows:
International Long Distance Local
Switched Voice
Generally tightly controlled Generally controlled by internal
ownership.
Generally controlled by internal
ownership.
Switched Data
(Off Net to Off Net)
Generally tightly controlled Generally controlled by internal
ownership.
Generally controlled by internal
ownership.
Non Switched Data
(On Net to On Net)
Generally there is limited
control.
Limited to little control. Limited to little control.
Video (CATV)
Issue is ownership and content. Not Applicable in General The control is limited to any
entity having a franchise or
similar license
Internet
Generally open and limited by
Government controls on
content.
Generally open and limited by
Government controls on
content.
Generally open and limited by
Government controls on
content.
Value Added Services
Generally controlled as an On
Net Service
Generally controlled as an On
Net Service
Generally controlled as an On
Net Service
The main concern is two fold; first, if there is a significant amount of trade differential flowing to these
countries perforce of the accounting irregularities and second there is a need to expend the market for US
services in international traffic that the accounting rules are a barrier to entry to.
2.1 Settlements as Part of Trade
The current International Record Carriers, IRCs, enter into bilateral agreements with other IRCs, namely the
PTTs of the foreign entities to agree to settlement or accounting rates between each other. Generally these are
bilateral agreements performed one at a time. The following is the FCC’s current estimate of the size of the
settlement process.4
“The United States paid roughly $5 billion in settlements to the rest of the world in 1995, up from
$2.8 billion in 1990. The U.S. out-payment results in part from the fact that U.S. consumers make
more telephone calls to foreign countries than foreign consumers make to the United States. In fact,
the size of the imbalance between U.S.-outbound and inbound minutes has accelerated in recent
years, as the chart in Appendix C demonstrates. To the extent that these settlement payments exceed
the actual costs foreign carriers incur in terminating U.S.-originated calls, they represent a
significant subsidy to foreign carriers. Based on our estimate of the costs of international
termination services, we estimate that at least three-quarters of the $5 billion in out-payments is
such a subsidy from U.S. consumers, carriers and their shareholders to foreign carriers.”
                                                          
4Federal Communications Commission, FCC 96-484, Washington, D.C. 20554 In the Matter of International Settlement Rates , IB Docket
No. 96-261, Adopted: December 19, 1996, ¶ 17.
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The system works in the following fashion. One carrier negotiates with another for the right to terminate traffic.
For example Canada negotiates with the Ivory Coast. They agree on a settlement rate of say $0.40 per minute.
This applies only to voice traffic. Say it is Teleglobe Canada and the Ivory Coast PTT. Now any traffic
between he two is a $0.40 per minute. At the end of the year they add the traffic up and if there is more traffic
from Canada to the Ivory Coast then the difference must be paid by Canada to the Ivory Coast at $0.40 per
minute.
Now let us assume that Teleglobe Canada wants to place a call to Uganda. It places the call in transit through
the Ivory Coats which charges a transit fee of say $0.020 per minute and the Ivory Coats has an agreement with
Uganda for terminating at say $0.15 per minute. The Teleglobe gets charged the sum.
The following is Teleglobe Canada perception of this process:5
“For an international telecommunications service provider international telecommunication
accounting practices distinguish between remuneration of the corresponding carrier in the country
of destination or transit for the delivery of its traffic and the charge in national currency collected
by an operator from its customers for the international facilities and services provided. According
to CCITT Recommendations D.150 and D.155, which concern tariff and accounting practices in
the international telephone service, the carrier in the destination country can be remunerated on
the basis of a flat-rate price per circuit, on the basis of the traffic units carried, or through a
procedure whereby accounting revenue is shared between terminal operators.
Under the flat-rate price and traffic unit price procedures the carrier at the destination establishes
its prices broadly based on the cost of the international circuit section it provides, the use of its
international exchange (gateway) and the national extension. Under the accounting revenue
division procedure the value of traffic in each direction between two corresponding international
carriers is multiplied by a mutually agreed tariff or "accounting rate" to give an accounting
revenue which is "in principle, shared equally between the (carriers) of the terminal countries in
respect of each traffic direction".
In theory, international carriers can agree on other than equal shares when their costs or the extent
of the facilities that each provides vary significantly; however, in practice accounting rates are
shared 50/50. If during a given settlement period (say a month or a quarter) there is more traffic
flowing in one direction than the other, the carrier which receives more traffic than it sends will
receive a greater amount of compensation from the corresponding operator for delivering its traffic
than it has to pay out. The direction of the traffic imbalance, therefore, determines which operator
has to pay its partner in a bilateral relation more than it receives.
If, for example, the accounting rate between Canada and a given foreign destination is SDR 1.66
and the accounting rate is divided 50/50 then Canada pays its foreign partner 1/2 x 1.66 = SDR
0.83 per minute of traffic to deliver that call to its destination from the mid-point (say mid Atlantic)
to the destination subscriber; to facilitate accounting, however, partners in a bilateral relation look
at the sum of the traffic in both directions for a given period and apply the accounting rate only to
the difference.
If, therefore, during the period there are more minutes of traffic flowing out of Canada than
flowing in, the imbalance obtained by multiplying by half of the accounting rate gives the "traffic
settlement" which is due to the foreign administration. The greater country's traffic imbalance with
another country, the greater its net payments outflow.
If traffic levels are equal in both directions the out-payments are the same in both directions. In
certain relations where traffic levels are more or less equal, carriers may agree to not exchange
international accounts. Contrary to the result of most other international trade in goods and
services transactions where a net export results in a net payment inflow in international
telecommunications a net outflow of traffic will result in a net payments outflow from the country
that "exports" that traffic.
                                                          
5
 See: “THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SETTLEMENTS PROCESS: WHAT'S NEEDED? DESTROY AND
REPLACE IT OR ADJUST IT?”, Peter A. Stern, Teleglobe Canada Inc., Montreal, IIC Telecommunications Forum, 25 - 26 October 1990.
Washington.
Page 4
Collection charges are considered to be a purely national matter fixed by the provider of the
international services subject to government, regulatory, financial and competitive constraints. The
International Telecommunication Regulations like CCITT Recommendation D.150 emphasize the
need "to avoid too great a dissymetry between charges applicable in each direction of the same
relation”. 10
The key issue however is that Teleglobe has an agreement that any traffic that it terminates is voice and that it
will pay the Ivory Coast at the agreed to rate. It cannot generally go back and say, this is Internet voice and I do
not want to pay the Ivory Coast. A new entrant can start that way but an existing entrant places their existing
agreements in jeopardy. Thus there is a general agreement that if there is an existing settlement agreement
between two parties that the Parties shall honor the terms of the agreement and that any termination or transit of
traffic shall be via the agreement and thus will require the payment of the pre-agreed settlement fees. This
therefor places and existing carrier at jeopardy in view of attempting to get Internet terminations.
2.2 Accounting Rates and Settlements6
To understand the principles of accounting rates and settlement costs it is necessary to understand how a call is
made in an international call. The accounting rules are to international traffic what the access fees are to
domestic. The senior author has discussed this issue in detail elsewhere. 7The following Figure depicts that
process.
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A customer in Chicago desires to place a call to Melbourne, Australia. The customer first uses the transport and
switch of Ameritech, who then connects to MCI. MCI provides transport and switching. The international
record carrier chosen by the customer is AT&T. MCI then hands the call off to AT&T and AT&T has an
agreement with the Australian IRC, International Record Carrier, namely an accounting agreement, to handle
all traffic at the net rate of say $0.55 per minute. For that, the Australian PTT then handles the call and places it
to the terminating point in Melbourne. The customer is billed $1.55 per minute. The IRC in the US charges the
customer for their switching and transport and then adds on the costs of MCI and that of Ameritech, generally
visa the access fee applied as a LEC.
The accounting rate is the rate agreed to by and between and amongst international record carriers for the
provision of a unit, say a minute, of telecommunications, generally voice, between two locations or
terminations. For example the United States carrier AT&T may agree to a number, say $0.45 per minute, with
France Telecom, for all traffic between the United States and France, no matter what the direction of the traffic.
This fee is the full and complete fee for the delivery of that minute from the midway point of the cable to the
end destination point in the called location. The accounting rates is supposed to represent the total cost of
carrying the traffic from point of origin to point of destination.
The settlement rate is the mechanism that any pair of carriers select to divide up the number of minutes from
and to each other based upon the accounting rate already agreed to. Namely, if AT&T provides France
Telecom with 500 million minutes, and France Telecom provide AT&T with only 400 million minutes, and the
agreed accounting rates if $0.045, then at then end of a period, AT&T owes France Telecom, 500 million less
400 million, namely 100 million times $0.45, or $45 million dollars.
There is the third factor of why a call is $0.55 from the US to Israel but is $1.90 from Israel to the US. The
answer is quite simple. The US and Israeli carriers have agreed to a settlement fee of say $0.35 per minute. The
US market is competitive for barriers thus there cannot be an excessive distortion in price. Thus the $0.55
represents a fail demand based price subject to the $0.35 “subsidy” paid in the accounting rate. However, in
Israel there is a pure monopoly and thus there is no clearing of the market and the PTT charges a rate based
upon a social and fiscal policy that states that this is a means to subsidize those who cannot afford to call
internationally. It is social policy and not economic policy that dictates the actual price.
The FCC states that the accounting rate system has the following characteristics:8
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The current accounting rate system was developed as part of a regulatory tradition that
international telecommunications services were supplied through a bilateral correspondent
relationship between national monopoly carriers.9 An accounting rate is the price a U.S. facility-
based carrier negotiates with a foreign carrier for handling one minute of international telephone
service. It was originally intended to allow each carrier to recover its costs for terminating an
international call.10 Each carrier’s portion of the accounting rate is referred to as the settlement
rate. In almost all cases, the settlement rate is equal to one-half of the negotiated accounting rate.
At settlement, each carrier nets the minutes of service it originated against the minutes the other
carrier originated. The carrier that originated more minutes of service pays the other carrier a net
settlement payment calculated by multiplying the settlement rate by the number of imbalanced
traffic minutes.11
There is also some discussion of the sender keeps all system or the bill and keep approach. This has been
discussed by Tarjanee the head of the ITU as follows:
Call termination fees offer a methodology which fits well with the World Trade Organisation’s
trade liberalisation framework. They fulfil many of the principles defined earlier for accounting
rate reform. The idea would be that each country, or operator, would define one standard charge
for terminating calls, irrespective of where those calls come from. The call termination charge
would be comparable to the national interconnection charge levied, for instance, on mobile
operators interconnecting with the public telephone network. The system would be transparent,
flexible, non-discriminatory and (hopefully) cost-based. The latter will probably depend on the
degree of market competition which is allowed in each national market.
Call termination fees have received the blessing of the OECD and are currently under discussion in
the WTO and the ITU. They are opposed by some carriers who are unwilling, or unable, to disclose
their cost structures for terminating calls. They are also opposed by those carriers who feel that
they should not be required to pay more for having their calls terminated in foreign countries than
they themselves charge for terminating calls. But the fact is that providing telephony service is
more expensive in some countries than others. The accounting rate system, which is based on a
50/50 revenue sharing agreement, implicitly assumes that costs are equal in all countries. This is
patently not the case. The possibility exists for countries to agree on a split which departs from
50/50 but in practice this is never adopted except in "sender keeps all" arrangements. A system,
such as call termination fees, which does not pretend that costs are equal in all countries would be
much to the advantage of developing countries.
Thus under the existing settlement agreement, bilateral and multilateral, the existing carriers have generally
affirmed and agreed to pay settlements on their voice circuits and that any change by them directly or otherwise
would put their agreements in breach and could result in the immediate termination of their traffic from their
home locations to the countries with whom they have agreements. The existing agreements are generally and in
most cases expressly for the provision of voice traffic and have followed the generally accepted terms in
existence for the past one hundred and thirty years.
2.3 Technological Challenges
We will focus initially on voice telecommunications since it represents the bulk of the telecommunications
market. There are several technologies that can be used to provide voice communications.
Standard Telecommunications: This approach is as described above. It is the standard way that
telecommunications, especially voice telecommunications is provided.
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Call-Back: The call back approach assumes that a call from a foreign country, say Israel, is charged at the rate
of $1.90 per minute to the United States. However, in the United States the charge for a call to Israel is $0.50
per minute. Thus if the caller could call the United States From the United States, and call himself from the
United States he could lower the costs dramatically. The system then allows the caller to call a data node which
then places a call back to him from the United States and completes the call.
On Net to On Net: This is a standard corporate network and generally is at dramatically lower rates. Hotels
also use this approach for in hotel to foreign connections. Generally these circuits are on a private network that
is outside any settlement agreement. Frequently they carry voice, data and even video.
Leaky PBX, On Net to Off Net: The leaky PBX is the source of much concern from foreign countries. A hotel
may allow calls to “leak” from the hotel to other locations, thus bypassing the local telephone companies
termination rates.
Internet: This is the newest possibility. It allows for the call to be placed over the Internet or Internet
like/connected network.  These are generally free of settlements and also generally cannot even asses
settlements since they go over different routes for each packet. Namely, in a TCP/IP packet type network, it is
possible that a call from the US to Israel, may in one packet go through London, and in the very next packet to
Warsaw, then to Rome, and then to Tel Aviv.
3. ECONOMIC FACTORS
The following is a summary of the economic factors relating to each of the countries that we have addressed as
well as a brief status of their telecommunications infrastructure. We have selected several of the key countries
and have depicted the key economic factors as well as the key telecommunications factors. It is clear that there
are significant opportunities in each of these nations but that they are clearly divided into four categories
depending upon the state of economic development and the state of political development. We argue that these
states can be divided into the extremes as follows:
3.1 Basic Economic and Telecommunications Demographics
The population of these countries estimated in 1998 is shown in the following Table. Clearly the largest is
China and the second being India. The place of Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and even
Malaysia make them a significant player in the evolving markets. The relative positing of each country using
1998 estimates of population is shown below. Despite Singapore’s significant advanced economic success it is
an almost insignificant player in the overall set of market players.
The telecommunications sector in this region of the world is a dominant sector of the international trade in
services. In this sections we present a summary overview of the sizes of that sector for the Asian market of
focus. In this section we evaluate several key issue regarding telecommunications infrastructure and the
international market for services as represented by the initiation and termination of international traffic. Each of
the countries in question has demonstrated a rapid growth potential but each country has taken the position of
handling entry into the international market in a different fashion. Japan has been the most liberal in opening up
its international market and the Philippines has been the most restrictive.
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The detailed economic factors relate strongly to the overall telecommunications environment. The following
Table summarizes the results for the countries described above. The following Table is a detailed summary of
these countries.
Country Population
(000)
GDP/Capita GDP
($000,000,000)
Settlement
Payout
Settlement/
GDP
Telephones (000) Settlement/
Telephone
China 1,282,510 $2,900 $3,719,279 $309,753,604 0.0083% 36,364 $8.52
India 937,851 $1,500 $1,406,776 $256,291,264 0.0182% 20,434 $12.54
Indonesia 205,833 $3,500 $720,417 $54,945,148 0.0076% 2,137 $25.71
Japan 125,960 $21,300 $2,682,937 $275,446,516 0.0103% 66,016 $4.17
Malaysia 19,768 $9,800 $193,722 $26,815,150 0.0138% 3,261 $8.22
Philippines 71,222 $2,530 $180,191 $184,285,405 0.1023% 902 $204.25
Singapore 2,902 $22,900 $66,463 $46,527,312 0.0700% 1,375 $33.83
South Korea 45,622 $13,000 $593,086 $224,585,206 0.0379% 19,683 $11.41
Taiwan 21,511 $13,510 $290,609 $162,976,907 0.0561% 13,480 $12.09
Thailand 60,078 $6,900 $414,540 $71,958,693 0.0174% 3,259 $22.08
Vietnam 73,185 $1,300 $95,141 $65,305,158 0.0686% 3,712 $17.59
The following depicts the annual growth rate in telephone lines for each of the above countries for 1998. This
is based upon an analysis of ITU, CIA, World Bank and other sources and as with the other analysis in this
paper is preliminary in form and does not reflect any commitments by the governments involved. Vietnam has
the largest growth rate and is expected to remain that way for a while.
Annual Growth Rate Estimates 1998
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The following Table presents the growth rate for two periods based upon the DLJ report. Note the differences
in key countries such as China. They argue that China has a CAGR in excess of 40% over the past seven years.
Note that the prior chart was a projection for 1998 alone. They project a CAGR for China in excess of 25% for
the next three years. The Philippines is the greatest over the next period but that is generally because of the low
base level. China is clearly adding one or more RBOCs per year. Clearly Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia are
good growth markets.
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Growth Rate vs. Country (DLJ Report, May 1997)
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The following Table depicts the telephone density in telephones per 100 people. Clearly Taiwan, Korea,
Singapore and Japan are on a par with the Western developed countries. In contrast the other countries are at
least an order of magnitude lower in scale.
Phone Density per 100 Person Estimates 1998
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The following is an estimates of the number of new phone lines to be installed in 1998. The total number is in
excess of 26 million and each line generally costs $2,000 US to install with a total investment of in excess of
$52 billion just in new growth. This does not include the growth of  new wireless lines, be they cellular or
wireless local loop. These estimates are based upon the more conservative numbers and not the DLJ numbers
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New Phones (000) Estimates in 1998
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What this shows is that China, India, Thailand and Vietnam appear to have the greater growth rate, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and the Philippines are not growing as rapidly. Using the DLJ data the following chart depicts the
growth projections for the next three years in total lines.
-
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
Ch
ina
Ho
ng
 
Ko
ng
Ind
ia
Ind
on
es
ia
Jap
an
Ma
lay
sia
Ph
illi
pin
es
Sin
ga
po
re
So
uth
 
Ko
re
a
Ta
iw
an
Th
ail
an
d
Ph
on
es
(00
0)
1998
1999
2000
The following chart depicts the phone density versus annual growth rate of telephone lines. It clearly
demonstrates that there is no significant correlation between infrastructure growth rate and total market
availability. Namely, densely populated telephone markets may grow as fast or as slow as the less densely
populated. Thus it is not necessarily the case that the current status is a predictor of the further potential.
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The following table depicts the growth in telephone sets over the past several years in the target countries.12
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The following chart depicts the total traffic in minutes per year for each of these markets for 1995.13 The
interesting fact is that Indonesia and Malaysia have much lower traffic to and from the US than does the
Philippines. The may be understood better in that most of their traffic in intra regional in nature. For example
Singapore to Malaysia is twenty sixth in total traffic volume inter-country in the world. This is shown latter.
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This traffic usage is summarized below in terms of the overall share of this traffic flow by each of the key
countries. What this shows is the currently Japan is still the dominant tariff producer and consumer. Korea, not
surprisingly, is second. When we add Hong Kong to China, the combination now becomes number two and is
probably the fastest growing in terms of both rate and volume.
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The following Table depicts the recent summary by Donaldson regarding the penetration of telephones as well
as the growth rates in each of the target countries with the exception of Vietnam. The telephone numbers are in
000,000s and the most significant penetration expectations is in China, growing at the rate of several RBOCs
per year.
 Telephones (000,000) CAGR CAGR
Country 1990 1996 2000 2005 1990-1996 1996-2000
China                 6.90              55.30                  137.90                  170.00 41.4% 25.7%
Hong Kong                 2.50                3.40                      4.30                     3.90 5.2% 6.4%
India                 5.10              17.00                    28.30                    45.70 18.3% 19.2%
Indonesia                 1.10                4.20                    10.20                    22.10 25.0% 24.7%
Japan               54.50              61.10                    68.50                    73.00 1.9% 2.9%
Malaysia                 1.60                3.90                      7.00                     8.20 15.9% 16.0%
Philippines                 0.60                2.00                      7.00                    12.20 22.2% 36.8%
Singapore                 1.10                1.50                      1.90                     2.10 5.4% 6.5%
South Korea               13.30              19.60                    26.10                    25.10 6.7% 7.4%
Taiwan                 6.30              10.00                    13.40                    12.80 7.9% 7.6%
Thailand                 1.30                4.40                      9.20                    18.10 22.4% 20.3%
Total          2,084.30          2,178.40               2,313.80               2,398.20 15.7% 15.8%
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3.2 Settlement Demographics
Using the above data, we have related it to the settlement rates and to the overall settlement amounts on a per
capita basis. It is through this analysis that we can develop a more detailed understanding of the economic
impact of settlements and the distortions of this process on economic growth.
The following chart depicts the percent ratio of Settlements to Exports versus GDP per capita. What this
clearly depicts is that there is a strong inverse relationship between settlements and GDP. Namely such
countries as Japan have strong economies and thus depict both low settlement rates as well as high GDP.
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The following chart depicts the total number f minutes per telephone versus the GDP per capita. Again it shows
a negative slope indicating that more people are using the service and that the economies that are stronger are
generally more open to usage.
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We have plotted Settlement per Telephone versus the GDP/Person. There seems to be no logical basis to the
relationship. The exceptionally high value is the Philippines and the lowest is Japan. Even at high GDPs there
is a high settlement fee. The argument has generally been that with lower infrastructure costs the costs of
settlements were justifiably higher. This analysis seems to indicate that despite all reasonable variable being
explored, there is a settlement rate agreed to solely on the basis of local custom.
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Settlements Vs GDP/Person
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The following Chart depicts the total flow of funds based solely on telecommunications settlement fees.14 This
chart shows the funds from settlement from and to the US in traffic flow.
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The following Chart depicts the relationship between settlement rate and growth in GDP. There is an indication
that and increase in settlement is a negative factor in growth of GDP. Namely that one may suspect that based
upon this type of data that the more open the market is for trading the greater the possibility that the for growth.
                                                          
14
 See the FCC data base in the International Bureau.
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3.3 Traffic Flow
The following Table depicts the international traffic for the top fifty rated links or routes as relates solely to the
Asian market. These traffic links represent a significant portion of the overall world trade flow under the
services portion of the WTO regarding telecommunications services. 15
Rank Route A  Route B  Outgoing*  Incoming*  Total*
 1 United States  Canada  2,787.28  1,795.00 4,582.28
 3 Hong Kong  China  821.00 707.00 1,528.00
 6 United States  Japan  469.22  295.04  764.26
 22 United States  Korea (Rep.)  283.45  123.99  407.44
 26 Singapore  Malaysia  190.00  159.80  349.80
 28 United States  Taiwan-China  225.99  93.54 319.52
 30 United States  Hong Kong  213.86  100.55  314.41
 31 United States  Philippines  267.34  41.77  309.11
 41 Japan  Korea (Rep.)  150.28  106.50  256.78
 44 United States  India  191.59  51.96 243.55
 45 Japan  China  171.01  71.00  242.01
 47 United States  China  169.54  64.00  233.54
The above chart depicts several key facts. Namely:
• If one looks at the traffic differences, namely the imbalance due to traffic from one country to another,
generally the country with the greater internal costs has the lower traffic flow outbound. Namely, there is
a 6:1 difference between the US and the Philippines. On the other hand Singapore and Malaysia are
almost equal.
 
• If one looks at the economic development imbalance, namely the GDP per capita difference, and attempt
to use that as a discriminate, there appears to be little GDP factor and the pricing of telecommunications
internally is still the dominant factor.
 
• The dominant links based on total traffic are still to and from the United States even though there is
significant intra region commerce. This is expected to change as liberalization of international
termination rules are effected.
                                                          
15
 Notes: Outgoing and incoming refer to the first economy shown.* Million of minutes of telecommunications traffic. Source:
ITU/TeleGeography Direction of Traffic database.
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In addition if we plot the ration of traffic from country A to country B versus the ratio of international carriers
from country B to country A we obtain the following.
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This clearly shows that as the distortion in the number of carriers in each market changes that the traffic is
imbalanced proportionately. This is the essence of the trade imbalance. The following chart however depicts
the traffic ratio and the number ratio by country pair. The traffic ratio is the normalized traffic inbalance, namly
traffic difference. The number ratio is the normalized number imbalance betweencarriers in each country.
Perfectly balanced traffic is a 0% traffic ratio. The greater the traffic ration the greater the settlement. The
conclusion is simple, the more competition in carriers the more balance in traffic. Thus zero settlements.
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3.4 Dominant Players
The dominant players in each market are summarized in this section. For the most part they are the PTTs and
also for the most part the relationship between the government and the PTT is singular and thus is essentially
an agent of the government policy. In many countries there is also the closely linked relationship between the
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manufacturers and the PTT. The following Table summarizes many of the key and dominant International,
Long Distance and Local telecommunications players in the markets.16
Country International Long Distance Local Ownership
China China Telecom China Telecom
Lian Tong Telecom
Ji Tong
China Telecom (100% Government, MPT)
Lian Tong (25% Ministry Electronic
Industry, 25% Ministry Railways, 25%
Ministry Energy, others)
Ji Tong (100% Government, various)
Korea Korea Telecom
Dacom
Korea Telecom
Dacom
Korea Telecom Korea Telecom (80% Govt, pubic)
Dacom (Lucky Goldstar, Samsung, KLB,
others)
Indonesia Indosat
Satelindo
PT Telkom PT Telkom PT Telkom is 80% Govt and public.
Indosat is 65% Govt
Satelindo is PT Bimgraha, and 25%
Deutsche Telekom
Malaysia Telekom Malaysia
Binariang
Telekom Malaysia
Binariang
Syrikat Telefon
Telekom Malaysia
Binariang
Syrikat Telefon
Telekom is 69% Govt.
Binariang is 47% Burnhannudin/TF
Stephens
Philippines PLDT
Digital
Eastern
Telecommunications
PLDT
Digital
Eastern
Telecommunications
PLDT
Digital
Eastern
Telecommunications
Singapore Singapore Telecom Singapore Telecom Singapore Telecom 65% Govt. and public
Taiwan Chunghwa Telecom Chunghwa Telecom Chunghwa Telecom 100% Govt.
Thailand Communications
Authority of Thailand
Tele. Organization of
Thailand
Telecom Asia
Thai Tel. & Tel.
Tele. Org of Thailand
Telecom Asia (NYNEX 18%, Charoen
Pokphand)
Others all 100% Govt. of Thailand
The following is a summary of some of the major status factors for the countries discussed above. He primary
focus is on each countries international settlement efforts.
China China is a non-WTO country which has recently integrated what was Hong Kong
into its overall structure. Recently the Chinese government carriers have
commenced discussions with Hong Kong Telecom regarding the government
telecommunications entity taking an equity position in the company. This seems t
indicate that the Chinese government will be taking a stronger hand in the overall
operations and control of that entity.
Indonesia Indonesia’s telecommunications entity has been focusing on using its
telecommunications network as a critical factor in developing and expending its
economy.
Japan Japan seems to be the most open market. For example KDD and AT&T have
recently entered into an agreement for a settlement rate that differs from the standard
that has been used. Namely, the rate will be adjustable and will reflect the “market
conditions”. In contrast NTT, the local telephone company, has vacillated from a
position of breaking itself apart to keeping itself together. Government officials
seem to now believe that a strong and dominant NTT is a strategic play for Japan in
negotiating a position as a player in the interconnection of other carriers in Asian
markets. This will potentially give NTT a strong negotiation position in becoming a
dominant player in these markets.
Malaysia
Philippines The Philippines is a developing nation and has the most strict controls on the
ownership and openness of the telecommunications market. It is expected that this
market, also being one of the slowest growth markets in economic terms, will also
be the slowest in terms of telecommunications liberalization.
                                                          
16
 See Donaldson, Lufking & Jenrette Report on Asia Communications, May 1, 1997.
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Singapore Singapore Telecom is a major player in Asian Telecommunications markets. It
tightly controls all of the internal Singapore telecommunications services and
generally maintains a tight telecom market place. There seems to be a liberalizing
trend as exhibited by WorldCom’s bid for a fixed line telecommunications license.
Singapore Telecom’s monopoly ends on March 31, 1997.
South Korea Korean Telecom has recently lost its local monopoly position. The Ministry of
Information and Communications will award one new national license for basic
telephone service. The potential winner may be a group led by Dacom, Hyundai,
Korea Electric Power, Samsung, and other locals. Companies such as Sonkyong
have also indicated an interest in getting into international telecommunications.
Dacom has recently ventured into the Internet voice arena with agreements with
Alphanet and VocalTec.
Taiwan Taiwan is still a tightly controlled monopolistic telephone company controlled by
the government.
Thailand Thailand has a significant infrastructure and seems to have a rapidly growing set of
interconnections driven by its growing industry. However there also seems to be a
policy vacuum that has slowed rapid growth. Several years ago NYNEX along with
a consortium of local companies established a new local telephone entity and have
even set up a R&D facility in Bangkok.
Vietnam
4. WTO STATUS
The foreign PTTs, through their countries, generally have entered into the WTO agreements that generally
place voice in the settlement arena and data in the non-settlement elements. The World Trade Organization
(WTO) is the principal international body concerned with solving trade problems between countries and with
negotiating trade-liberalizing agreements. WTO replaces of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and is the embodiment of the results of the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round of trade negotiations conducted under
the GATT. The Director General of the WTO is Renato Ruggiero of Italy.
4.1 WTO Overview and Status
WTO has a cooperative relationship with the United Nations but is not a UN specialized agency. It was
established on January 1, 1995 as a result of the implementation of the Uruguay Round results. The WTO
encompasses previous GATT legal instruments as they existed when the Uruguay Round was completed
(known as GATT 1994), but also extends new disciplines to economic and trade sectors not covered in the
past. Whereas the GATT's scope was limited to trade in goods, the WTO also covers trade in services,
including such sectors as banking, insurance, transport, tourism, and telecommunications sectors as well as the
provision of labor. In addition, the WTO covers all aspects of trade-related intellectual property rights
(copyrights, patents, trademarks, etc.). Furthermore, while the GATT had a relatively ambiguous status as a
multilateral agreement without any institutional provisions, the WTO is an international organization with a
stature commensurate with that of the World Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF).
WTO's precursor, the GATT, was established on a provisional basis after World War II. When the agreement
took effect in 1948, it was expected to be the forerunner of the International Trade Organization (ITO) which
would have been a UN specialized agency. But plans for the ITO were abandoned when it failed to get U.S.
congressional approval, and the GATT remained the only international instrument laying down rules accepted
by nations carrying out most of the world's trade.
For 47 years the GATT provided the main international framework in which countries could discuss trade
problems and, if need be, use the General Agreement's dispute-settlement provisions to solve trade disputes.
The basic principles and rules of the WTO are much the same as those for the GATT, but with a broader scope,
a more solid legal and institutional basis, and enhanced decision-making provisions which preserve individual
members' national sovereignty while precluding the damaging single-country blockages which plagued GATT's
dispute settlement system.
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Like the GATT, WTO embodies many reciprocal rights and obligations for trading countries, and its core
principle is the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) clause. Under this, trade must be conducted on the basis of
nondiscrimination -- all members are bound to accord each other treatment in tariffs and trade as favorable as
they give to any other member-country.
A second principle common to both WTO and GATT is that, to the maximum extent possible, trade protection
should be given to domestic industries only through the customs tariff and not through other measures (i.e. non-
tariff measures such as quantitative restrictions, arbitrary technical standards, and health regulations), so that
the extent of protection is clear and competition is still possible.
One of the most important accomplishments of the Uruguay Round was the establishment, for the first time, of
a set of rules governing trade in services. GATT economists estimated in 1990 that services -- such as banking,
insurance, tourism, construction, or telecommunications -- accounted for as much as 20 percent of total goods-
and-services world trade. The GATS agreement establishes a multilateral framework for trade in services and
provides a specific legal basis for future negotiations aimed at eliminating barriers that discriminate against
foreign services providers and deny them market access. The principal elements of the GATS framework
agreement include the most favored nation (MFN) treatment, national treatment (each government shall treat
foreign services and service suppliers no less favorably than its own), market access, and free flow of payments
and transfers. The rules are augmented by annexes addressing the special situations of individual service
sectors (financial services, telecommunications, air transport, and movement of labor). The GATS’ strong
provision on national treatment specifically requires GATS countries to ensure that domestic laws and
regulations do not tilt competitive conditions against foreign firms. Complementing the GATS rules are
binding commitments to market access and national treatment in service sectors that countries schedule as a
result of bilateral negotiations. These commitments became effective upon entry into force of the WTO.
4.2 WTO Agreement Details
The following Tables summarize the WTO agreements that exist for countries in question. The Tables are for
each country and correspondingly detail the services and time under which opening of the markets are to be
expected.
Indonesia Sector or Sub-sector Limitations on Market Access
Local service:
Public switched telephone service
Circuit switched public data network services
Local services are provided exclusively by PT Telkom and 5
regional joint operation scheme operators. Foreign equity
participation is limited to 35 per cent.
Long distance:
Public switched telephone service
Circuit switched public data network services
Long distance services are provided by PT Telkom
exclusively. Foreign equity participation is limited to 35 per
cent.
International:
Public switched telephone service
Circuit switched public data network services
Only through networks of  PT Indosat and PT Satelindo.
Callback is not permitted. International services are
provided exclusively by PT Indosat and PT Satelindo
(duopoly). Foreign equity participation is limited to 35 per
cent.
Internet Access Services Until 2005, only through networks of  PT Indosat and PTSatelindo for international access. More than 30 licences
have been issued Foreign equity participation is limited to
35 per cent.
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Malaysia Sector or Sub-sector Limitations on Market Access
Basic Telecommunications17
Basic local, inter-exchange and international
services; supplied over public
telecommunications transport networks using
any network technology; facilities-based; in each
of the market segment. 18
1. Voice Service (wired or wireless)
2. Packet-switched data transmission services,
including frame-relay services
3. Circuit-switched data transmission services
4. Private leased circuit service
5. International switching and other
international gateway facilities
Only through acquisition of shares of existing licensed
public telecommunications operators: Foreign shareholding
of up to 30 per cent in these service providers is allowed.
Unbound except as indicated in horizontal commitments.
India Sector or Sub-sector Limitations on Market Access
Telecommunication Services19,20 Voice
telephone service (CPC 7521**) Limited to
local/long distance, for public use over a public
telecommunication transport network.
Wire based (i.e. for fixed network of
subscribers).21
The service will be permitted to be provided only after the
operator gets a licence from the Designated Authority who
shall determine the need, if any, for issuance of new licences.
The terms and conditions of the licence will be as laid down
by the Designated Authority or Government or the prevailing
laws in the country.
There will be one operator other than Department of
Telecommunications (DOT)/Mahanagar Telephone Nigam
Ltd. (MTNL) in each service area for a period of 10 years
from the grant of licence after which the position will be
reviewed. The private operator should be a company
registered in India in which total foreign equity must not
exceed 25%. Service operator will be permitted to provide
long distance service within the licensed service area only.
Also, the subject of opening up of international service to
competition will be reviewed in the year 2004. Resale of
voice telephone services will not be permitted.  However,
licensees can grant franchises on commission basis for
providing public call offices (PCOs) service. The detailed
terms and conditions for providing the service will be as per
licence conditions
                                                          
17
 Excluding broadcasting services as defined under Broadcasting Act 1988.
18
 Pro-competition regulatory principle in respect of interconnection arrangement and competition (Refer to Annex I).
19
 Excluding broadcasting services and measures affecting such services.  Broadcasting is defined as a form of the uni-directional
telecommunication intended for large number of users having appropriate receiving facilities and carried out by means of radio or cable
network. This may include sound transmission, television transmission or other types of transmission.
20
 The definition and principles on the regulatory framework for the basic telecommunication services subscribed to by India are contained
in the annex titled "Explanatory Paper on Additional Commitments by India".
21
 The subject of opening up of national long-distance service beyond service area to competition will be reviewed in the year 1999.
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Philippines Sector or Sub-sector Limitations on Market Access
The following services (a-g) are offered only on a
facilities basis, for public use, using either wired
or wireless technology except cable television
(CATV) and satellite.
1. Voice telephone services
2. Local services
3. Toll services
4. Domestic
5. International
6. Packet-switched data transmission services
and Circuit-switched data transmission services
Entry is subject to the following requirements and conditions:
 
1. Franchise from Congress of the Philippines
2. Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
(CPCN) from the National Telecommunications Commission
3. Foreign equity is permitted up to 40%
4. Resale of private leased lines is not allowed
5. Call back, dial back and other similar schemes which
result in the same operation are not authorized.
6. Subject to the availability and efficient utilization of
radio frequencies.
Japan Sector or subsector Limitations on market access
Telecommunications services22
The following basic telecommunications services
supplied by Type I or Type II
Telecommunications Business:
1. Voice telephone services
2. Packet-switched data transmission services
3. Circuit-switched data transmission services
 
Type I Telecommunications Business is the
business which provides telecommunications
services by establishing telecommunications
circuit facilities.  Type II Telecommunications
Business is any telecommunications business
other than Type I Telecommunications Business.
Telecommunications circuit facilities are
transmission line facilities connecting
transmitting points with receiving points,
switching facilities installed as inseparable units
therefrom, and other facilities accessory to such
facilities.
Foreign capital participation, direct and/or indirect, in NTT
and KDD must be less than one-fifth.
                                                          
22
 Japan undertakes the obligations contained in the reference paper attached hereto.
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Korea Sector or Sub-sector Limitations on Market Access
C. Telecommunications services
Facilities-based:
1. Voice telephone services
2. Packet-switched data transmission services
3. Circuit-switched data transmission services
4. Private leased circuit services
None except that the provision of all services is subject to
commercial arrangements with licensed Korean service
suppliers
None except that: (i) Each service supplier must be a licensed
Korean juridical person. (ii) Until 31 December 1998, a
licence, including radio station licence, may not be granted to
a juridical person whose largest shareholder is: (a) Foreign
government,  (b) Foreign person, or (c) Juridical person 50
per cent (15 per cent, if the largest shareholder of the juridical
person is a foreign government or a foreign person) or more
of whose voting shares are owned by foreign governments or
foreign persons. (iii) Until 31 December 2000, a license,
including radio station licence, may be granted to a  juridical
person  in whom no more than 33% of the aggregate voting
shares are owned by entities identified in (a) through (c).
From 1 January 2001, a license, including radio station
licence, may be granted to a  juridical person  in whom no
more than 49 % of the aggregate voting shares are owned by
entities identified in (a) through (c). (iv) A licence, including
radio station licence, may not be granted to a juridical person
more than 33 per cent (10 per cent, in the case of wireline-
based voice telephone services) of whose voting share is
owned by a person23 (v) The largest shareholder of KT must
be Korean government or a Korean person. While KT’s share
owned by a person24 must be no more than 3 per cent, the
aggregate foreign shareholding in KT must be no more than
20 per cent until 31 December 2000, and no more than 33 per
cent from 1 January 2001.
(4)  Unbound except as indicated in horizontal commitments
Resale-based:
1. Voice telephone services
2. Packet-switched data transmission services
3. Circuit-switched data transmission services
4. Private leased circuit services
None except that: Provision of all services is subject to
commercial arrangements with licensed Korean service
suppliers. Until 31 December 2000 resale of voice telephone
services interconnected to the public telecommunications
network can only be supplied by companies established in
Korea.
None except that: Each service supplier must be a licensed
Korean juridical person. Foreign shareholding in suppliers of
resale voice telephone services, interconnected to the public
telecommunications network, will be permitted only after 1
January 1999. From 1 January 1999, foreign shareholding
will be permitted up to 49 per cent. As of 1 January 2001,
100 percent foreign shareholding will be permitted.
4.3 Summary of Agreements
The following chart summarizes the dates for the market openings for each of the WTO countries and
summarizes it for the non-WTO participants such as China. It will be interesting to see how China deals with
the Hong Kong agreements and if they will be sustained and used as a basis for China’s participation in a WTO
agreement.
                                                          
23
 The definition of "a person" is in accordance with the relevant provision of the Presidential Decree of the Korea’s Telecommunications
Business Law.
     24The definition of "a person" is in accordance with the relevant provision of the Presidential Decree of the Korea’s Telecommunications
Business Law.
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Country Start Date
Countries In Agreement
Australia January 1, 1998
Hong Kong January 1, 1998
Japan January 1, 1998
Korea January 1, 1998
Malaysia January 1, 1998
New Zealand January 1, 1998
Countries Beginning after Official Start Date
Singapore January 1, 2000
Brunei January 1, 2004
Indonesia January 1, 2005
Thailand January 1, 2006
Countries Excluded from the Agreement
China NA
India NA
Pakistan NA
Vietnam NA
5. US POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The FCC in its Docket IB Docket No. 96-261, adopted December 19, 1997, stated the major policy issue in a
clear and precise fashion. Specifically it stated,
“U.S. consumers pay on average 16¢ a minute for a domestic long distance call, but they pay 99¢ a
minute for an international call.  Yet, the difference in cost between providing domestic long
distance and international service is no more than a few cents.  As a result of recent technological
advances, the underlying costs of providing telephony are becoming virtually distance insensitive.
For example, because of new fiber optic technology, the cost of undersea cables on a per circuit
basis is only one eighth of what it was seven years ago.  We anticipate that increased competition
in international satellite services will bring similar potential benefits to countries that are not now
served by undersea cables and comparable land facilities.  Differences in underlying costs
therefore do not explain why international services are so much more expensive than domestic long
distance services.  The difference is attributable in part to limited competition in the IMTS market
and in part to the inflated settlement rates paid by U.S. carriers to terminate traffic in foreign
markets.”
We address two policy areas in some detail; first is the issue of what should the accounting rate be and how
should it relate to a cost based system, and second, what is the policy future of Internet like telecommunications
which is currently free from any settlement process.
5.1 Cost Based Settlement
The FCC has argued in its recent NPRM on Settlements that costs should be the key factor in establishing
settlement rates. The FCC proposes that the costs be based upon three elements; international transmission,
local switching, and national extension.25 The Commission then predicates all of its costs analyses on these
numbers. While the author agrees with this approach for the current means and methods for switched based
voice telecommunications, the author  argues that such an approach fails when applied to alternative
telecommunications approaches.
                                                          
25
 See ¶ 35 of IB Docket No 96-261, FCC 96-484, December 19, 1996.
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The specific model as proposed by the Commission for costing contained the elements mentioned above. The
Commission applied a specific methodology to those elements to come up with certain costs. 26 The three
elements are: international transmission, local switching, and national extension. The author argues that rather
than using tariffs as the sole arbiter of  setting settlement rates that there is also a method for setting those rates
on a costs based basis that reflects the actual costs incurred by the in-country provider. This additional
approach shows that there can be an argument made for costs based upon forward looking technology as well
as obtaining returns on past investments, if such be the case.
5.1.1 International Cost Based Elements
The cost elements for each relate to the following elements:
Capital Equipment Costs: It can be argued that the capital plant and equipment is generally the same for any
country exclusive of tariffs and other tax like costs that the country must pay on the procurement of the
equipment. The country may also have a costs of capital, so then when the capital and plant and equipment is
equated to an annualized leased rate the lease rate must reflect that changing costs of capital. For example, in
Poland, the respondent sees a 25% excise tariff on any imported telecommunications equipment that increase
the capital costs base by that amount. In addition there is a risk premiums on capital financing of 2% to 2.2%
that raises the annualized effective lease rates. The following Table presents a typical example using Poland as
a case. If we assume an effective life, a tariff or excise tax rate, an interest rate and a risk market premium, then
for every dollar the costs of switching per month is as shown below.
Effective Life (Years) Tariff Rate Interest Rate Market Premium Monthly Fee
5 25% 8.00% 1.50% $0.0263
5 25% 10.00% 1.50% $0.0275
5 25% 12.00% 1.50% $0.0288
5 25% 14.00% 1.50% $0.0301
10 25% 8.00% 1.50% $0.0162
10 25% 10.00% 1.50% $0.0176
10 25% 12.00% 1.50% $0.0190
10 25% 14.00% 1.50% $0.0206
15 25% 8.00% 1.50% $0.0131
15 25% 10.00% 1.50% $0.0146
15 25% 12.00% 1.50% $0.0162
15 25% 14.00% 1.50% $0.0179
Now let us assume that each trunk associated with switching is approximately $200.00 US. This is a reasonable
costs for switching in large numbers. Then we further assume a usage of 100 minute per month per use or
equivalently a 1% Erlang load, a trunk can then support 100 subscribers. Thus we find that the capital per
subscriber per month, and corresponding per minute is:
Per Month Per Subscriber: Assume a ten year, 8% rate, and we have $2.60 per trunk per month or $0.0260
per subscriber per month.
Per Minute Per Subscriber: On a per minute basis this is $0.00026 per minute for switching.
The general conclusion is that switching is de minimis as a cost element.
                                                          
26
 See ¶ 37,  wherein the components are defines as: “ International facility component: The international facility component consists of
international transmission facilities, both cable and satellite, including the link to international switching facilities.  This component
includes only the half-circuit on the terminating end because originating carriers have traditionally been responsible for the half circuit
on the originating end of a call.  High capacity circuits, normally 1.544 Mbps or 2.048 Mbps circuits, are used for IMTS and most
telephone administrations offer these circuits to customers on a dedicated basis.  The cost element for this component, therefore, is based
on foreign carriers' private line rates for dedicated circuits. Multiple 64 Kbps circuits are derived from the high capacity channels and
multiplexed into voice grade circuits based on standard U.S. operating practices. This information, along with average monthly traffic
volume per circuit, is used to convert the private line rates to a charge per minute for each country. International gateway component:
The international gateway component consists of international switching centers and associated transmission and signaling equipment.
Foreign carriers do not generally offer a separate tariff rate for the international gateway component, so the study relies on information
published by the ITU. The cost of this component varies with the level of digital facilities. National extension component: The national
extension component consists of national exchanges, national transmission, and the local loop facilities used to distribute international
service within a country.  Foreign carriers' domestic rates and the distribution of U.S. billed service within a country26 are used to
compute an average charge per minute for cost of this component.”
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Transport Costs: The transport costs are the costs for the fiber or other telecommunications facilities. They are
generally distance sensitive but with fiber being more prevalent this distance sensitivity is no longer a
significant factor. We assume a similar capital costs for transport but we double it, thus it is $0.00052 per
minute as with the above argument.
Direct Operations Costs: These costs include the provisioning of network management, customer services,
billing, provisioning, inventory management, and repair and dispatching. These costs are generally personnel
driven and thus are produced at local market rates. Frequently these costs dominate the overall costs element of
the system. In US costs the total cost for these elements is between $4.00 and $8.00 per month per subscriber.
This is allocated across all of the subscribers usage, local, long distance and international. If we assume that a
typical international call represents 10% of the total usage, a high number, we have an average of $0.60 per
subscriber per month. This is $0.006 per minute.
Overhead Operations Costs: Generally this represents a 40% to 70% overhead. We shall use 50% based upon
the most likely costs as an overhead on the operations costs. This then is $0.003 per minute.
Sales and Marketing Costs: These should relate solely to local in-country operations.
The summary of cost basis is as follows:
Cost Element Unit Cost Number Units Total Costs
Capital Plant $0.00026 3 $0.00078
Transport $0.00052 2 $0.00104
Operations Costs $0.00600 3 $0.01800
Operations Overhead $0.00030 3 $0.00090
Sales Costs $0.00000 1 $0.00000
Total $0.02072
In the above we have assumed that there are multiple Units of each element involved in any transmission. This
is consistent with the model shown previously. If we further assume that the system is at best loaded at only
25% then the change to above model occur only in the Capital Plant and transport elements. We then quintuple
those numbers, increasing the costs about $0.0050 per minute, or at most 25 % increase. This is because the
dominant costs are operations. We have kept the operations costs at US rates, and we know if we factor in local
economy costs the rates drop a factor of four in most markets, thus reducing the costs to well less than $0.0100
per minute. It should be noted that these costs are dramatically lower than AT&T costs. These costs do not
include the sales costs, a significant factor, nor do they include any R&D, product development, marketing,
legal or other similar costs. These elements may easily, along with profit, raise the rate to a number comparable
to AT&T.
The point we seek to make is that a “bottoms up” analysis of costing is essential by a market by market basis.
The Commission has taken the approach of doing a “top down” approach using the “answer” of the tariffs. We
argue that a “bottom up” approach using the actual costs is the better approach.
5.2 Principle of Cost Based Pricing
We conclude this with the Principle of Cost based Pricing. The principle can be explained via the following
example. Consider the interconnection shown in the following Figure. Here we have a CMRS, an I-LEC, a C-
LEC, several IRCs, and their interconnection. The CMRS will be the focal point. The CMRS connects to the
IECs and to the I-LEC and C-LEC as well as to other similar players on the other side of the IECs.
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Call 2: LEC:IRC:IEC
Consider two calls. Call 1 goes from the CMRS to the local I-LEC. Call 2 goes from the CMRS, over an IEC
to a customer at a distant I-LEC. Both calls are originated by a CMRS customer and terminate on an I-LEC
customer.
Today, any IEC call must pay an interconnection access fee to the I-LEC to terminate on their network. As we
indicated this is a wealth transfer policy and does not reflect any true cost. The CMRS before the Act paid the
I-LEC a termination or origination fee and there was no compensation from the I-LEC to the CMRS. As we
have demonstrated that is no longer the case.
The Principle of Cost Based Pricing states the following: The consumer should pay for each link separately
and they should pay only for those links for which they are customers of that link provider. The payment the
customer makes should reflect a price that is in turn based on the costs of that link.27
The basis for the Principle is the same basis for the Baumol Willig theorem, namely maximizing consumer
welfare. The argument is based upon the theory of Ramsey pricing. The classic approach taken by Baumol and
Willig is as follows:
maximize {P1, …, Pm} [ CS + PS ]; subject to PS = F
where CS is the consumer welfare and PS is the production surplus or the profit of the monopolist provider.28 If
however, we eliminate the monopolist totally, that is maximize it on the basis of consumer welfare alone, and if
we assume a fully displaceable and commodicizable service, and if we further assume the change in technology
that eliminate scale in toto, then the resultant position is the Principle of Cost Based Pricing. Namely, each
separate provider sells their service on the basis on their own costs and the interconnection is free and reflects
not costs to the consumer.
                                                          
27The issue here is a quid pro quo issue of parity in providing interconnection in a commodicizable market. For example, if two or more
LEC or LEC like carriers enter a market, then there should be not interconnection fee and each carrier should price their services at the
price based upon their costs and have no third party intervenor establish a de facto subsidization. If however, one carrier provides a service
such ad aggregation to more efficiently interconnect, then this added non pari passu facility should be compensated at an equal,
comparable, and costs based level, shared amongst all players. The Baumol-Willig approach can apply here if we merely eliminate the
artifact of ensuring a profit to the monopolist as Baumol has consistently done. By maximizing consumer welfare at the expense of the
suppliers, namely by creating a competitive market, one arrives at the principle of cost based pricing.
28
 See Brown and Sibley, The Theory of Utility Pricing, Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 39.
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5.3 Interconnection Agreements
The Commission has raised concerns about individual settlement agreements and the possibility of various
large international carriers taking undue advantage of arbitrage opportunities within their own field of
operations.29 The author recognizes that the opportunities not only exists but lead to clear anticompetitive
practices. The smaller nondominant carrier has no recourse to this procedure and no remedy under international
law if the settlement agreement are allowed to be set on a company by company basis. The author argues that
the rates must be set as if they were standard tariffs, and in fact similar to the benchmark rates for interconnect
suggested by the Common Carrier Bureau in the Section 251 proceedings. The author argues that the
Commission should itself or through an appropriate government agency establish and set those rates. In the
case of interconnection, the Commission had established a process and procedure that has a default to the local
PUCs. The respondent believe that this process is a common process. Without recourse or remedy however, the
FCC should, if they are the entity of choice, set standard rate based upon the TSLIRC or similar pricing
models.
5.4 Internet Telecommunications
Data is generally free from settlements. This is the accepted result of the WTO negotiations and has been
opined on by various entities. The FCC states its position in the following in the following:
“There are other technological developments that accentuate the market distortions caused by
above-cost settlement rates. For example, the routing of bilateral traffic through third countries has
become increasingly prevalent as a means to arbitrage settlement rate differences. Such re-routing
can be helpful in undercutting the settlement rate system, but it can also lead to inefficient traffic
routing patterns that are not aligned with underlying economic network costs. Use of the Internet
also has emerged as an alternative to higher priced IMTS. Though internet traffic and switched
voice traffic are carried over virtually identical facilities, the price for internet service is far
cheaper because switched traffic is subject to international settlement rates, while internet traffic is
exchanged outside of the traditional accounting rate system.”30
The Organization for economic Co-Operation and Development, part of the European Common Union, ECU,
in its recent report further opines on the introduction of Internet type telephony and its advantages in its ability
to have zero settlements. The OECD Study states the following:31
“In the previous section, the call-back services which were examined provided service within the
framework of the accounting rate and collection charge system. In this section, services which by-
pass the international telecommunications charging system are examined. These services include
international simple resale, which is already being offered in some countries. Other services, such
as telephony using packet switched networks, including the Internet, would also be included in this
group of services.
An overview of the different charging and settlement for a number of technologies is shown in
Table 9. The services where there is no settlement are to a large extent used mostly by large
business customers, but they are becoming increasingly available to the smaller customers given
developments in technology, and regulation.
In general, the pricing structure for telecommunication services other than telephony does not
depend on time and distance, and does not normally incur a settlement between the operators 12 .
Telephone collection charges have also shown a trend toward being less time and distance related
reflecting the digitalization of networks. There is, therefore, precedence for using systems other
than accounting rates. Despite different charging frameworks many of these other services based
on technologies other than the PSTN are profitable.
                                                          
29
 See ¶ 75, ID-96-261.
30
 See: Federal Communications Commission, FCC 96-484, Washington, D.C. 20554 In the Matter of International Settlement Rates , IB
Docket No. 96-261, Adopted: December 19, 1996, ¶ 17.
31
 Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Paris, 1997, “New Technologies and Their Impact on the Accounting Rate
System”, p. 35.
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Table 9. Collection Charges and Settlement for Different Services32
Service  Technology  Collection Charge Type  Settlement
 Subscriber Line/ Trunk Line
Telephone  Switched Line  Time/Flat/ Time/Distance  Accounting rate system
Packet  Packet  Time/Volume/ Volume  Settlement by traffic
volume
X 400  Store-and-Fwd  - /Volume  No settlement
Leased line  Leased Line  Flat  Half split (No settlement)
Frame
Relay
 Frame Relay,
ATM
 Flat Half split (No settlement)
Internet  Packet / Others  PSTN, ISDN, L. lines, etc. / Flat  No settlement
The above table depicts the WTO agreements as reflected in the Uruguay round of GATT talks. Namely that
Internet, namely TCP/IP, is free from settlements and is the only one free on a full circuit basis.
Tarjanee, head of the ITU has also stated:33
“If market distortion were the only fault with the accounting rate system, it could probably survive.
After all, economists usually agree on only one thing, namely that no market is ever perfect. The
difficulty is that there are a growing number of other pressures for reform. An increasing share of
traffic bypasses the accounting rate system completely because it is carried by just one operator
instead of two (end-to-end service), because it travels over private networks, or because it
travels over the Internet. Increasingly, owners of infrastructure wish to provide service directly to
end-users instead of relying on correspondent partners. Furthermore, at the local level, callback
operators and resellers exploit the fact that tariffs are not cost-based by arbitraging different prices
between countries.”
The OECD report goes on to state:34
“Internet Telephony
The ability to provide voice services based on packet switched network technology is increasingly
providing a competitive threat to traditional public switched telecommunication networks.
Although the use of this technology for voice is only emerging, there is considerable interest in its
potential. This interest is being fuelled by the fact that time-based usage charges are not
traditionally used for packet switched networks. The Internet is providing the underlying
infrastructure to begin experiments with providing international voice communications over
networks based on packet switched network technology. Although initially voice communications
tended to be computer to computer communications, developments are now emphasizing computer
to telephone communications. The advantage of packet switched networks also includes, as well,
the ability to handle integrated voice, data, and video services which many customers are
increasingly requiring for day-to-day business. The fact that there are no international usage
charges and only the price of local calls is paid is evidently providing an impetus to Internet
telephony. Although arguments have been made that existing Internet capacity will not be able to
handle an explosion of voice communication on these networks, it is not evident that the required
capacity will not be forthcoming if the demand for services is there.
The development of Internet telephony (see Information Infrastructure and Pricing: The Internet,
OECD/GD(96)73 for a comprehensive overview of pricing on the Internet) threatens the viability of
the existing accounting rate system. The fact that telecommunication operators, and many
governments, seem to continue to support high collection charges (and accounting rates) is in fact
                                                          
32
 FR stands for Frame Relay Service. Source: OECD
33
 Rome, 25 March 1996, How will the accounting rate system need to be modified in a liberalised market? Liberalisation & Privatisation
of the European Telecommunications Sector Preparing for 1998 & Beyond, Dr Pekka Tarjanne, Secretary-General, International
Telecommunication Union (ITU),An International Conference arranged by IBC UK Conferences Ltd.
34
 OECD p. 39-40.
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accelerating the development of new technologies which help by-pass the existing payments system.
Long-term strategy by operators, if they wish to maintain their viability, would argue for lower,
more competitive prices which would serve as well to slow down the development and diffusion of
alternate calling procedures.
Governments, given the increasing liberalisation of data networks and in PSTN markets, will have
difficulty in regulating the entry of many new services which use packet switched network
technology, including voice communications. First, there is the problem in differentiating one type
of digital message from another. Second, there is the difficulty in disrupting communications with
any one 40 relation in that re-routing of traffic is a simple procedure. Third, there is the policy
emphasis that many governments have placed on the diffusion of broadband infrastructures to
create the information infrastructures of the future. To have an economic impact, usage prices on
these infrastructures need to be low otherwise new services and on-line applications will be slow to
develop. Many of these new services will gravitate to packet switched networks because of price
advantages.”
Furthermore Tarjanee further states:
“But such dependence on settlement payments is an unwise strategy. Experience shows that traffic
stimulation and creating an attractive investment climate are more effective strategies for
telecommunications development. By keeping charges high, developing country PTOs create
incentives for callback and other forms of bypass which erode their competitive position.
Furthermore, a new threat is emerging in the form of Internet telephony. The Internet famously
does not employ the usage-based tariffing schemes on which the financial structures of PTOs are
based, but instead employs flat-rate tariffs. Furthermore, the Internet has developed without any
revenue-sharing mechanism between operators. In so far as there are payments from end-users,
they are retained by service providers on a "sender keeps all" basis.
Internet telephony is based on packet switched rather than circuit switched networks. It would
probably cost more to trace and bill the precise route taken by each data packet across the
network than it would to send the call in the first place. The current state of the art in Internet
telephony is quite primitive, attractive mainly to hobbyists and enthusiasts. But one can envisage
a rapid evolution over the coming months. Already callback operators are offering to terminate
calls originating from computers. Soon, those callback operators and resellers will use the
Internet itself as a backbone for their calls.
If we lived in a rational world, few consumers would choose to have their conversations garbled by
computers. But the prevailing price structures in international telephony are not rational. The
ultimate commodity being sold is bandwidth. Voice traffic uses tiny amounts of bandwidth but is
charged a high price. Data traffic uses huge amounts of bandwidth but is charged a low price.
Consequently, "cross-over" technologies, such as voice over data networks, exploit these
economically irrational tariff structures.”
Thus under the WTO and under the generally agreed to terms of the WTO agreements on services, especially
in telecommunications, data is free from both transit fees and settlement fees, and TCP/IP is defined as a form
of data and is thus free from such fees. If a country who is a signatory to the Uruguay rounds decides to
unilaterally violate that terms then it subjects itself to the severest penalties under the WTO.
6. CONCLUSIONS
There will continue to be significant and dominant growth in these Asian markets. There are several major
concerns for US companies ranging from market entry for products as well as for services. The WTO
agreements open these markets for services in the next several years. The FCC has commenced its efforts in
attempting to address the settlement and accounting rate issue. The growth in international telecommunications
traffic and the pursuant growth in the internal economies will be strongly reliant upon free and open trade. An
element of that trade is telecommunications. The telecommunications market is internal and external. We have
argued herein that the internal portion is generally under the control of the local country and as best we might
try we can at best influence that in the normal course of trade and tariff discussions. The traffic in international
voice, data, and other service however is a new development within WTO, being part of GATS, and thus
demands closer attention. The trade barriers of telecommunications must be realigned to meet the changes in
these markets.
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• Does the “Trade in Services” resulting from the settlement rates have a significant positive influence on
the growth of telecommunications services?
 
The answer seems to be that the more open the market the more growth. Settlement rates open the markets and
the assumption that high settlement distortions are used for infrastructure growth are wrong. In fact
infrastructure growth is exogenously fueled and open telecommunications markets are the elements of that fuel.
 
• Does the growth in telecommunications services relate to the GDP or similar measures of the country’s
economic development status?
 
The analysis that we have performed seems to directly correlate open markets with high GDP per capita. This
clearly is a questionable cause and effect relationship which needs further study. The answer however is clear
that they are correlated.
 
• Does the growth rate of a country’s economy correlates with the openness of that country’s market for
Trade in Services as relates to telecommunications?
 
The answer is the same as the above question. The best examples are Japan versus the Philippines. The
Philippines has the most tightly controlled telecommunications market. The intent seems to be to provide
financing from these market distorting mechanisms.
 
• What should the U.S. position be regarding its ability to influence access to markets by its unilateral
power on settlements?
 
Trade in services is protected under the WTO and the US should take all steps as is necessary to secure the
position of US companies in this trade process. Namely, the US should not take punitive actions against any
US company that through technology effects an open market. If the company, via technology such as Internet
telecommunications, can provide voice and similar services, then the US should, as it has already done in call
back, support and not penalize those companies.
 
• Does there exist a set of economic efficiencies in the use of telecommunications via enhanced services,
value added services, or Internet services that will allow such providers to have economic advantages to
side step the settlement process?
 
The Internet options clearly are the best options available for opening telecommunications markets. The
TCP/IP protocol supports voice, data, video and other options.
 
• What will be the effect of Internet and Internet like voice, video and data services wherein the “path” of
the message has no definition? Does any country have the tight to regulate a “mixed” message format?
The use of Internet is an enabling technology. Unlike call back which is a true arbitrage situation, Internet and
Internet like applications allow for rapid global expansion at an extremely low cost of entry for the backbone
costs and arguable for the local switching costs.
